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Abstract 
In this paper we draw on the theory of dynamic capabilities to examine the development 
of the only surviving family-owned Liverpool shipping company. The Bibby Line was founded 
in 1807 to take advantage of the growing sea-trade based in Liverpool. The company remained 
in shipping until the mid-1960s when a series of external crises led the owner, Derek Bibby, to 
begin a process of diversification. In the last 50 years, the Bibby Line has grown into a £1 
billion business with interests in retail, distribution and financial services as well as a 
continuing commitment to shipping. Our intention is to demonstrate how multi-generational 
ownership contributes to the creation of dynamic capabilities in family firms. The distinctive 
nature of Bibby as a long-standing family business is related to unique assets such as patient 
capital, flexible governance structures as well as the ability to mobilise social and human 
capital. 
 
Keywords: 
Dynamic capabilities; resource-based view; strategic renewal; familiness; entrepreneurship; 
shipping; diversification 
  
1 
 
Dynamic capabilities in a sixth generation family firm:  
Entrepreneurship and the Bibby Line 
Introduction 
A key issue that has occupied business historians is identification of factors that 
contribute to the long-term survival of family businesses (Church, 1993; McGovern, 2007; 
Scranton, 1992; Wild, 2010). Historical studies are important for clarifying the links between 
family ownership and business survival (Mackie, 2001; Mahoney, 2003; Roca, 2007). Scholars 
have used the resource-based view (RBV) to provide a deeper understanding of how family 
businesses manage generational change (Boyce, 2010; Kininmonth, 2006; Wilson, 1998). 
Danneels (2011) adopts the concept of dynamic capabilities to examine typewriter firm Smith 
Corona’s failed response to personal computing. It is acknowledged that family firms possess 
distinctive assets and resources that contribute to their business success (Bammens, 
Voordeckers, and Van Gils, 2011; Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, and Garcia-Almeida,  2001; 
Jones and Rose, 1993; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006; Tokarczyk et al., 2007). We combine 
recent conceptualisations of dynamic capabilities (DC) (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 
2007) with entrepreneurial cognition (Grégoire, Corbett and McMullen, 2011) to examine a 
sixth generation family business. Entrepreneurial cognition concerns the ability to take 
‘judgemental decisions about the coordination of scarce resources’ particularly in complex 
situations where objectives are ambiguous (Casson, 1993, p. 30).  
Our research question is as follows: how does multi-generational ownership contribute 
to the creation of dynamic capabilities in family firms? The extent to which family firms 
survive beyond the third generation is contested (Stamm and Lubinski, 2011). However, a 
range of studies provide insight into factors that influence multi-generational survival 
(Lubinski, 2011; Kininmonth, 2006; Berghoff, 2006; Mackie, 2001; Smith, 1993; Sluyterman 
and Winkelman 1993; Emmanuel, 1993). Chandler (1980) argues that UK family firms lacked 
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the financial and human capital to pursue long-term growth. Colli and Rose (2008, p. 199) 
claim that there is considerable research evidence from the last 20 years to demonstrate that 
Chandler undervalued ‘the resilience and capabilities of the family company’. According to 
Handler (1994, p. 133) effective management of the succession process ‘is the most important 
issue that most family firms face’. While Rose (1993, p. 135) points out that succession 
includes an ‘entrepreneurial legacy’ that incorporates the firm’s assets such as technology, 
goodwill, contacts and reputation. ‘Familiness’ has been used to explain this transfer of tacit 
knowledge from generation to generation (Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, and Garcia-Almeida, 
2001). Habbershon and Williams (1999) also indicate that familiness resides in the unique 
bundle of idiosyncratic resources resulting from the interaction between family and business. 
Others argue that family-owned businesses have distinct cultural values that distinguish them 
from non-family firms (Denison, Lief, and Ward, 2004). One key source of competitive 
advantage is the stability that stems from the ability of family firms to pursue long-term 
strategies in comparison to the short-termism of public companies constrained by stock market 
pressures (Colli and Rose, 2008).  
 A family firm established in Liverpool at the beginning of the nineteenth century is 
studied to analyse links between multi-generational ownership, entrepreneurial cognition and 
dynamic capabilities. The Bibby Line survived the economic turmoil associated with post-war 
Liverpool to become a successful diversified company in the twenty-first century. Derek Bibby 
began the diversification process in response to changing market conditions in the early 1960s. 
The oil crises of the 1970s prompted a more radical shift into financial services and eventually 
distribution. Diversification continued under the leadership of Simon Sherrard who was 
managing director between 1985 and 2000 and Michael Bibby (Derek’s son). We begin with a 
summary of the strategy literature and an overview of the Liverpool shipping industry. 
Following an outline of our research approach we present data on the Bibby Line. We then 
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discuss the implications of ‘dynamic capabilities’ for the renewal of family firms and, finally, 
we draw our conclusions for theory and practice.  
Dynamic capabilities in family firms and beyond 
According to Wild (2010) research on radical change is rare in business history 
(Chapman, 1990; Killick, 1981; Sogner, 2007). Our search of the literature did not identify any 
additional publications beyond the three studies cited by Wild (2010). This lack of focus on 
radical change is particularly puzzling in the case of family businesses, which account for large 
proportions of firms in most major European economies: France, 69%; Germany, 79%; 
Sweden, 73%; Spain, 85%; UK, 61% (Family Business Network, 2008). Family firms possess 
distinctive assets and resources based on commitment, loyalty, agency costs, personal 
incentives, flexibility and the ability to innovate (Bammens, Voordeckers, and Van Gils, 2011; 
Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, and Garcia-Almeida, 2001; Casson, 1999; Jones and Rose, 
1993; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006; Tokarczyk et al., 2007).  Hence, the ability of family 
firms to establish and maintain competitive advantage through succeeding generations 
continues to attract attention (Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002; 
Mazzola, Marchisio, and Astrachan, 2008; Miller, Steier, and Le Breton-Miller, 2003).  
A number of scholars suggest that the capabilities developed by family firms enable 
them to convert existing resources into competitive advantage (Habbershon, Williams and 
Macmillan, 2003; Shepherd and Haynie, 2009; Wild, 2010). Effective corporate 
entrepreneurship is also proposed as a contributor to the long-term success of family firms 
(Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006). Another important distinguishing feature of family 
business is the concept of ‘patient financial capital’ (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Family firms can 
adopt more creative and longer-term investment strategies because they are not under pressure 
from financial markets (Dreux, 1990). A range of theories underpin studies of family firms 
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(Siebels and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012) including principal–agent theory (Ehrhardt and 
Nowak, 2011; Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001), governance (Lubinski, 2011), learning 
(Berghoff, 2006), institutional theory (Mackie, 2001), organisational ecology (Ehrhardt and 
Nowak, 2011) and international business (Moya, 2010). A recent paper by Chirico and 
Nordqvist (2010) appears to be the only study in which the concept of dynamic capabilities is 
applied to family firms. This is surprising because historical studies offer a robust way to 
validate theoretical models associated with management (Moya, 2010). 
Dynamic capabilities are the tools employed to manipulate existing configurations in 
order to create new resources (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  This view finds broad support in 
the literature (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Ambrosini, Bowman, and Collier, 2009; 
Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; 
Winter, 2003; Zahra, Sapienza, and Davidsson, 2006; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) identified four core DCs: leveraging existing resources; creating new resources 
internally; accessing external resources; and releasing resources.  In response to claims that the 
concept is tautological, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) point out that DCs are defined in terms 
of their functional relationship to resource manipulation and are independent of firm 
performance. Finally, they propose that DCs in moderately dynamic markets rely on detailed 
and analytic routines, learning before doing, and that execution is linear. In high-velocity 
markets, effective DCs are based on simple experiential routines relying on newly created 
knowledge and iterative execution.  Teece (2007) takes a broader view, identifying three 
categories of DCs: capacity to sense and shape opportunities; capacity to seize opportunities; 
and orchestrating resource manipulation. There are strong similarities between Eisenhardt and 
Martin’s (2000) operationalisation of DCs and the idea of ‘resource manipulation’ (Teece, 
2007; Makadok, 2001). 
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Penrose (1959) recognised that tacit knowledge and managerial cognition were key 
factors in the successful realignment of resource. The importance of cognitive representation 
and its influence on the timing, selection and execution of DCs is acknowledged in the general 
literature as well as the extant family business literature (Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Chirico 
and Nordqvist 2010; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Collective 
cognition shapes a firm’s ‘dominant logic’, which in turn determines the collective response to 
environmental cues (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986).  Finally, founders also play a significant role 
in establishing organizational norms by leaving their imprint long after departure (Baron, 
Hannan, and Burton, 1999).  In this paper we contribute to theory by demonstrating how multi-
generational ownership and entrepreneurial cognition are linked to dynamic capabilities in a 
family business. 
Liverpool shipping families 
Liverpool in the early nineteenth century ‘with its complexity of merchanting, banking, 
insurance and ship-broking services, had become a magnet for the aspirations of many a young 
man seeking his fortune in the rapidly expanding commercial and shipping enterprises on the 
Mersey’ (Marriner and Hyde, 1967, p. 10). The most important of these multi-generational 
family firms, which were established in the nineteenth century and survived into the late 
twentieth century, are summarised in Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Despite the demise of most family-owned shipping companies during the course of the 
twentieth century, Liverpool was still the UK’s second most important port in the mid-1960s. 
However, decolonisation had a negative impact on the city because it was the base for major 
‘imperial shipping lines’ such as Blue Funnel and Elder Dempsey (White, 2011;.  2008). There 
were three other factors that contributed to the demise of Liverpool shipping: the rise of air 
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travel, containerisation (Laing, 1975) and the growing importance of trade with the European 
Economic Community, which favoured UK ports on the south and east coasts (Kinsey, 1981; 
Lane, 1987). Marriner (1982, p. 126) points out that Liverpool also suffered from a poor public 
image associated with ‘strikes, vandalism, dereliction, pollution and high crime rates’. What 
we demonstrate in this paper is that the Bibby Line was unique amongst Liverpool-based 
shipping family firms established in the nineteenth century. Firms founded by the Harrisons 
(Hyde, 1967) and the Holts (Hyde, 1956; Chandler, 1960) did survive into the late twentieth 
century (not as family firms) and diversified their businesses. Shipping companies established 
by John Swire (Marriner and Hyde, 1967) and the Elder Dempsey Line (Davies, 2000) ceased 
to be family-owned businesses early in the twentieth century.  In contrast, Bibby successfully 
diversified into financial services, distribution and retail while remaining in family ownership. 
Research approach 
According to Godelier (2009, p. 803) the ‘field of history sought objectivity by using a 
positivist epistemology’ to eliminate subjectivity and emotion. Business historians have, 
however, increasingly engaged with the fields of strategy and organisation studies (Clark and 
Rowlinson, 2004). Harvey and Wilson (2007) also stress the importance of historians engaging 
with other social sciences. Such engagement represents a deliberate attempt by business 
historians to inform managerial decision-making while rejecting claims of being ‘inveterate 
empiricists’ who eschew ‘general theories’ (Hannah, 1984, p. 219).  In this study we adopt a 
research approach based on the construction of a historical narrative as a form of sense-making 
(Popp, 2009). As Gartner (2007, p. 615) argues, narrative approaches are concerned with 
‘relational realities, socially constructed, not individual subjective realities’. 
 Data for this study are drawn from a combination of interviews, public data, the 
company archive and an archive associated with Liverpool Maritime Museum. We 
systematically analysed annual financial reports1 relating to Bibby and its subsidiary companies 
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between 1971 and 2010.  The summary of various activities provides robust data on changes 
in capabilities (Appendices 3, 4 and 5). Financial data enabled us to build a picture of the 
problems facing Derek Bibby during the 1970s and 1980s. As Lee (1978) points out, financial 
reports provide an important source of historical data related to ‘company behaviour’.    
The company archive was central to the creation of a narrative related to Bibby’s 
dynamic capabilities over the last 50 years. For example, the archive helped demonstrate how 
factoring activities were established using existing resources. In turn factoring contributed to 
the creation of new resources by diversifying products and acquiring related businesses.  
Published accounts of Bibby history, by independent historians, proved useful in developing 
our understanding of how the company developed over 200 years (Watson, 1990; McIntyre-
Brown, 2007). Moreover, interrogation of the Maritime Museum archive confirmed the 
veracity of data from the company archive.  The Financial Times historical archive 1882–2006 
was searched for related articles and the Lexis Library archive was searched for reports in the 
Daily Post and Liverpool Echo. We extracted factual information from press articles rather 
than journalistic opinion (Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo, 2002; Henderson and Mitchell, 1997; 
Nobeoka and Cusumano, 1997).  All online archives were accessed via the University of 
Liverpool library portal. 
While it was possible to develop a clear understanding of how DCs were 
operationalised and, to a lesser extent, the rationale for adopting a particular DC it was not 
possible to establish a view of entrepreneurial cognition (sensing, shaping, seizing and 
implementing) from archival sources. Therefore, we utilised primary research data from 
interviews with the current MD, Sir Michael Bibby (three interviews),  his predecessor Simon 
Sherrard who was in post from 1985 to 2000, the MD of Bibby Distribution (Iain Speak), the 
MD of Bibby Financial Services (David Robertson) and Nick Bacon, head of  Bibby 
Factoring’s marketing company (Appendix 3).  The interviews provided crucial insights into 
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the way in which Derek Bibby began to diversify the business. Hence, the three sources of data, 
archival analysis, in-depth interviews and newspaper reports, offer an excellent means of 
supporting our narrative about the development of DC in the Bibby Line.  
Beginnings of the Bibby Line 
 John Bibby (1775–1840) became involved in shipping in 1801, and formed a 
merchanting business with John Highfield in 1807. Bibby concentrated on regular sailings to 
Dublin, then to the Mediterranean and ultimately Trinidad and Brazil. The partnership with 
Highfield was dissolved in 1821 and the company continued as John Bibby & Co. By 1823 
Bibby was operating sailings to Lisbon, Bombay and Canton. Bibby also established an iron 
merchant’s, a copper works and two copper smelting works. At the time of his ‘mysterious’ 
death, apparently murdered during a robbery, his estate was valued at £25,000, a considerable 
sum at the time (Watson, 1990). Subsequent generations of the Bibby family are summarised 
in Table 2 and Appendix 1. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE  
John was succeeded by his son James who by 1865 had 23 modern steam ships 
concentrated in the Mediterranean. In 1859 Bibby began a long association with Harland and 
Wolff Shipyard in Belfast. Bibby also took on James Leyland as a partner in 1859 and in 1873 
at the age of 60 was persuaded to retire by Leyland who was given power of attorney and 
quickly acquired a majority shareholding. Tiring of his life as a ‘country gentleman’ James 
Bibby ordered two steamers, costing £120,000, from Harland and Wolff, to trade with Burma 
(Boyce, 2003). James provided the finance while his nephews Arthur and Herbert managed the 
business (Appendix 1). McIntyre-Brown (2007, p. 26) points out that though this arrangement 
was not unique in shipping, ‘it would be almost 90 years before owners and managers came 
together again.’  
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Between 1901 and 1910 trade was depressed with the end of the Boer War and the 
termination of associated lucrative government contracts. During the First World War Arthur 
appointed his accountant G.W. Robins as manager and eventually a partner in 1920 (Watson, 
1990). In 1927 a second non-family member was appointed general manager, Leslie O’Brien 
Harding, an expert on Burma trade. When Arthur died in 1935, his son Harold took over a well-
managed firm. Bibby’s entire fleet was requisitioned for the Second World War and 
Government troop-ship contracts continued until they were terminated in 1962. Post-war 
political instability in Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Suez Canal created major problems 
for UK shipping (Watson, 1990). Increasing foreign competition in shipbuilding, the 
emergence of containerisation (Laing, 1975) and the growth of air travel led to 30 years of 
economic, social and political upheaval in Bibby’s home port of Liverpool (Lane, 1987; 
Marriner, 1982).  Harold’s son Derek had joined the company after the war and succeeded his 
father in 1969. In 1965 orders were placed with Japanese shipbuilders for two bulk carriers; 
the first time Bibby ships had been built outside the UK.2 This investment was important as it 
demonstrates Derek’s increasing influence:   
On my first day it was made very clear to me that it was the age-old policy of the 
company never to borrow and only to order a ship when it already had the cash in 
the bank to pay for it. In that way, it was thought that it could not go bust, though 
later events showed that it could easily have gone out of business with galloping 
inflation (McIntyre-Brown, 2007, p. 34). 
Adopting newer business practices enabled Derek to build up the fleet between 1965 
and 1977 (Herbane, 2010). A favourable tax regime and high inflation meant that ships 
increased in value between order and delivery. To protect the company from world trade 
uncertainties Bibby joined the Seabridge Shipping Ltd consortium operating bulk carriers. In 
1968 Bibby bought the Britain Steamship Company Ltd, a consortium member, from cash 
reserves.3 Bibby made further acquisitions in 1971, first buying the loss-making Bristol Line, 
which owned a one-third stake in Dart Containerline, a transatlantic freight operation.4 The oil 
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shocks of 1973 precipitated a crisis in shipping and Derek Bibby left the Seabridge consortium 
in 1977 selling two bulk carriers for £5.9 million.5 Bibby moved from a profit of £5.3 million 
in 1976 to a loss of £4.9 million in 1977 with loan repayments of £10.8 million.6 As the 
company had over-invested in ships it was compelled to sell to repay banks. Subsequently, 
Bibby’s stake in Dart Containerline was sold to the other two shareholders.7    
On retiring in 1985, Derek Bibby appointed Simon Sherrard, a non-family member, as 
managing director. Sherrard accelerated diversification by moving into financial services and 
distribution. Derek’s most significant legacy was regaining financial control of the business. 
While Arthur Bibby, his son and grandson managed the business, 45% of the shares were 
owned by their cousins who were descendants of James Bibby (Appendix 1). In 1986, Sir Derek 
increased his share of the business to 84% after buying out Robin Bibby Thompson, his sister 
Jane Paton-Smith and two directors. Michael Bibby, Derek’s son, joined the Bibby Line as 
finance director in 1992 and became MD of the Bibby Group in 2000. Michael continued 
diversification by investing in shallow water accommodation, offshore oil field services, 
contract logistics, financial services, burial parks, employment law and health and safety 
advisory services, and retail (Appendix 2). Bibby’s historical links with the sea were 
maintained through the Bibby Line as well as Bibby Maritime and Bibby Ship Management, 
which included a ‘state-of-the art’ training facility in Mumbai. Michael stresses the importance 
of Bibby’s heritage while emphasising the need for a strong commercial focus: 
We have been brought up not to look to the business for our lifestyle – profits 
are ploughed back into the company for future generations; my father left the 
bulk of the family shareholdings in family trusts, with equal treatment for all 
the family. My priority is to make sure there is a sound and still growing 
business for the seventh generation to take over (McIntyre-Brown, 2007, p. 
37). 
Until the mid-1970s Bibby was essentially a shipping business. In response to a number 
of major changes in the business environment, the company undertook a rapid diversification 
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strategy focusing on distribution and financial services. Bibby Holdings manages a wide 
portfolio of businesses: Bibby Maritime, Bibby Ship Management, Bibby Consulting and 
Support, Garic (storage tanks and site services) and Woodland Burial Parks. From a turnover 
of £6.7 million in 1970 Bibby expanded to well over £1 billion turnover in 2010 (Appendices 
4 and 5). In the following sections we draw on the theory of dynamic capabilities to illustrate 
how the Bibby Line’s successful transformation was managed.  
Dynamic capabilities in the Bibby Line 
Bibby faced periods of relative equilibrium punctuated by sudden and significant 
change such as the loss of government troop-carrying contracts in the early 1960s, the growth 
of air freight and oil shocks in the 1970s, and a series of recessions since 1980. We draw on  
the four ‘modes’ of DC proposed by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) to show how Bibby used a 
combination of leveraging existing resources, creating new resources, accessing external 
resources and releasing resources to successfully reinvent the company’s business activities 
(Danneels, 2011) (Appendices 3, 4 and 5). 
Leveraging existing resources: marine-related activities 
Extremely low freight rates meant that six ships were laid-up in 1977 and five sold in 
1978 to reduce interest charges. The company recorded a pre-tax loss of £13 million in 1978 
when turnover was £19 million (Appendix 5). The early 1980s marked a turning point for the 
Bibby Line; the fleet had been reduced to nine vessels and Derek obtained a 20% share in a 
North Sea oil accommodation platform owned by a Swedish consortium, Consafe. A year after 
the outbreak of the Falklands War in 1983, Consafe won a Ministry of Defence contract to 
supply two accommodation barges to house troops in the South Atlantic. Bibby acquired a 
substantial stake in one barge and Consafe owned the second. In 1985, Consafe went into 
liquidation and, following a dispute with the Swedish National Debt Office (to whom the debt 
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was ultimately owed), Bibby repaid around $5m (McIntyre-Brown, 2007).   However they were 
able to buy the second barge at a competitive price from the receiver and renamed the two 
accommodation barges Bibby Venture and Bibby Resolution.  At the end of the Falklands War, 
the New York Department of Correction hired two accommodation barges on a five year 
contract for $17 million (McIntyre-Brown, 2007), marking the beginning of Bibby’s 
controversial association with floating prisons. In 1993, the UK Government gave approval for 
the first floating prison in the UK since the nineteenth century.8 Meanwhile, self-elevating jack-
up platforms were used to provide accommodation and maintenance support for oil platforms 
in the Middle East and Asia.  Bibby also supplied floating storage units and production facilities 
to the oil industry, winning contracts with Chevron Texaco and Maersk Oil (McIntyre-Brown, 
2007).    
While Bibby entered the 1980s with a much depleted fleet Derek was able to capitalise 
on the company’s most important ‘intangible asset’, an extensive shipping knowledge. By this 
time outsourcing ship management was common practice and Bibby secured a contract to 
manage two ships for the Shipping Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago in 1984 (Watson, 
1990). With his mandate to ‘broaden the base of the company’ and reduce exposure to the 
cyclical nature of shipping, Sherrard embarked on an extensive programme of diversification.   
Two years later, Manx Ship Management (MSM) was established in the Isle of Man as a joint 
venture with two banks. In 1991 Bibby acquired a 50% stake in Botany Bay Shipping Holdings 
to further its interests in the management of chemical tankers. The same year Bibby acquired 
100% of MSM, which was renamed Bibby International Services. Sherrard continued to invest 
in shipping-related activities with the purchase of seven vessels, 12 accommodation barges and 
two ‘jack-up platforms’ between 1985 and 2000. Turnover slowly began to increase and 1987 
was described as ‘a year of change in our fortunes’.9 The process of leveraging Bibby’s existing 
shipping knowledge to move into related areas of activities was confirmed by Michael Bibby 
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and Simon Sherrard. Both David Roberson and Iain Speak indicated that BFS and Bibby 
Distribution also adopted a leveraging approach to expand activities in the major divisions 
(Appendix 3). 
Releasing assets: marine  
A defining feature of Bibby’s business approach is the mantra ‘sell in boom and buy in 
recession’.10 However, profit declined as a result of the world depression precipitated by the 
1973 oil crisis, culminating in a £13 million loss in 1978 (Appendix 5) attributable to the sale 
of five ships: Ocean Bridge, Australian Bridge, Canadian Bridge, Oxfordshire and the English 
Bridge. By 1982 the Bibby fleet had been reduced to nine ships from the peak of 20 in 1975 
(Watson, 1990). Disposal of Marine Division assets from 2004 onwards was much more 
strategic. The price of oil was high and the cost of ships increasing as a result of higher steel 
prices. Demand for shipping capacity was also increasing due to the import of raw materials to 
China and the export of finished goods (Li, Dunford, and Yeung, 2012). Disposal of shipping 
assets allowed the company to capitalise on high prices before the 2008 recession. In 2005 
agreement was reached to sell the LPG (low pressure gas) fleet, two chemical tankers were 
also sold and the cash used to pay-down debt in other areas of the business.11 In 2005 the 
Marine Division was restructured around three business units: Shipping, Off Shore and Marine 
Services. A number of small coastels were sold and the newly formed division won a contract 
with the Dutch Government to provide floating detention centres. Off Shore continued to 
benefit from high oil prices, hence, conversion of an existing construction support vessel into 
a diving support vessel (DSV).  A new DSV was also chartered and these were the first new 
vessels in the North Sea for 15 years.12  
By 2007 (the company’s bicentenary) the marine business had sold assets worth over 
£60m as part of Bibby’s boom–bust strategy.13 The accommodation division contracted a 
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Chinese company to refit a coastel as a four star floating hotel. Off Shore opened offices in 
Trinidad and in 2009 the new 57,000 dwt Shropshire was delivered and immediately chartered.  
In total, the Bibby Group raised £260m of which £120m was used to pay down debt: £20m 
invested in ‘non-cyclical’ businesses including the retail chain Costcutter, Bibby Holdings was 
allocated a further £20m to invest in small high-growth businesses and £40m was invested in 
niche shipping assets such as the Sapphire and the Bibby Renaissance coastels.14 The 
quotations in Appendix 3 confirm that while the company adopted a long-term perspective 
there was a willingness to act decisively when assets under performed.  
Creating new resources: finance-related activities 
Before retiring in 1985, Derek Bibby successfully established leasing agreements with 
large companies such as Express Dairies (McIntyre-Brown, 2007). He also created a factoring 
business which initially operated within Bibby’s accounts department (Appendix 3). In 1990 
the Berisford Group sold its factoring subsidiary to Bibby for the value of net assets.15 Berisford 
Factors was renamed Bibby Factors and John Connell, financial controller at Bibby Line, was 
appointed MD.  Bibby Factors joined the Association of Invoice Factors (AIF), which 
represented small factoring companies. The larger Association of British Factors and 
Discounters (ABFD) accounted for 90% of UK turnover in factoring and invoice discounting.16 
ABFD members tended to operate like banks leaving the smaller privately-owned factors to 
offer a personal service for their clients.17 Bibby Factors made a number of acquisitions in the 
early 1990s and became Bibby Financial Services (BFS) Ltd in 1998. By 2000 BFS was the 
UK’s largest private operator in the factoring sector with 8% of the domestic market. Factoring 
was dominated by the large banks and David Robertson believed Bibby was nearing ‘saturation 
point’ for a small private company in the UK market.  In response Robertson embarked on an 
internationalisation strategy to continue the group’s growth.18 BFS acquired Source One 
Financial, a US factoring company in 2001 and over the next four years opened offices in 
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Chicago, Dallas and Los Angeles. With UK factoring levelling out, Bibby developed a long-
term diversification strategy involving new products, such as asset finance, trade finance and 
invoice discounting, as well as new markets.19   
In 2000 Bibby Asset Finance was established as a subsidiary of BFS to provide hire 
purchase and leasing facilities to UK firms. Bibby Asset Finance then acquired Leeds Leasing, 
which had lost £61,000 in the previous year but had assets worth £3.8 million.20 The acquisition 
represented an expansion into a new sector of the market as Leeds Leasing provided: ‘Bibby 
Financial Services with the skills and presence it requires to further penetrate the fast growing 
small business finance market.’21 BFS established offices in Australia, USA, Canada, Ireland, 
Poland, France and in 2007 acquired Cash Reform, the leading independent factoring company 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics, for an undisclosed sum.22 BFS also acquired California-
based Account Funding and opened offices in New Delhi, which David Robertson described 
as a ‘brave move’ adding, ‘India represents an important territory in the sphere of global trading 
and as such one that we need to be in. Its growing economy and underdeveloped factoring 
market is exactly the type of market we want to be in.’23 By early 2007 BFS had achieved a 
presence in nine countries earning pre-tax profits of £19.7 million, a 58% increase on the 
previous year.24 BFS created a Global Board so that each operational region could ‘operate as 
an autonomous business unit, driving growth across the regions, while still contributing to the 
overall success of the Group.’25 Asia-Pacific became the focus of expansion, especially India 
and China via Hong Kong.26  
The 2008 recession meant that bank lending to small businesses declined and BFS had a 
considerable increase in UK companies using its services. On 30 September 2008 (days before 
the Lehman Brothers crash) BFS agreed a finance facility of £340 million of bank funding 
(Barclays Corporate, Lloyds, RBS and Credit Agricole)  for four years to target small firms in 
the UK and Ireland.27 The deal was refinanced in January 2011 allowing BFS to secure funding 
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until 2014.28 The success of financial services was the result of a serendipitous response to the 
shipping crises faced by Bibby in the early 1980s. Derek Bibby’s intention was to use 
‘factoring’ to identify growing firms in which he could make an equity investment. Every 
single business failed while factoring rapidly grew into a major business (Michael Bibby, 
Appendix 3). 
Accessing new resources: distribution, retail and Bibby Holdings 
In 1985 Bibby Distribution was established because it required little capital as vehicles 
and warehousing were leased (McIntyre-Brown, 2007). It was also a growth industry at the 
time and Bibby invested in Freeway Distribution, which marked the beginning of a relationship 
that lasted for more than two decades. The business developed with a series of acquisitions 
including Transport and Warehousing Facilities, International Storage and, in 1994, 
Alexandra-Molyneux Haulage. An emphasis on long-term relationships meant that existing 
customers stayed with Bibby Distribution. A milk collection contract with the Scottish Milk 
Marketing Board brought additional contracts from the newly privatised Scottish Milk Ltd. 
Bibby Distribution then acquired the loss-making Inter Forward, a logistics and distribution 
company. Michael Bibby described the takeover as ‘an important strategic development’ that 
allowed Bibby Distribution to increase turnover from £73 million in 1999 to over £180 million 
in 2007.29 Bibby Distribution then entered the niche market of high-value, fragile goods in 
2000 with the acquisition of two specialist pottery transportation firms, which Bibby merged 
to form Route One Pallet Network (McIntyre-Brown, 2007).  
The early twenty-first century was a period of consolidation as Bibby Distribution 
invested £3m in First Milk, a company formed by the merger of Scottish Milk Ltd and Axis.30 
A freight-forwarding company Winlen Bay, renamed Bibby International Logistics, was 
acquired in 2003 to help Bibby Distribution to expand into mainland Europe. By 2005 Bibby 
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Distribution was reporting considerable organic growth generated by new contracts and the 
renewal of existing agreements. However, rising fuel costs and increased competition led to a 
restructuring of the pallet network. Depots were integrated with the Route One specialist 
ceramic transportation business and a new centralised distribution centre established.31 In 2006 
Bibby Distribution acquired the entire share capital of Sutton Support Services allowing it to 
expand into the paper and packaging sector and Archfield Shipping, a freight forwarding 
company. In 2010 Bibby Distribution signed a deal worth £50 million to deliver products from 
First Milk’s dairies to national customers. 
Bibby Distribution was restructured in 2006 with the Chief Operating Officer in charge 
of operations and the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer concentrating on strategy 
and acquisitions.32 Bibby Distribution diversified into recruitment and training as it acquired 
Direct Workforce, a company specialising in the supply of warehouse staff and drivers whose 
services Bibby Distribution had been using for many years (Iain Speak, Appendix 3). It also 
bought a 26% stake in System Training, which provided training for drivers in the haulage 
industry. Following expansion into Europe, Bibby Distribution joined the newly formed 
Logistics World Alliance (LWA). The LWA consisted of five European companies with a 
combined fleet of 10,000 vehicles and 500 bases across Europe and Asia.  The alliance allowed 
Bibby Distribution to draw on external knowledge and resources and keep pace with 
operational and technological innovations in the sector as well as benefiting from ‘cross 
marketing and operational synergies’ (McIntyre-Brown 2007, p. 93).  
The Bibby Line Group continued to generate cash and in August 2007 bought a 51% 
share in the Costcutter supermarket group. While apparently an expansion into an unrelated 
industrial sector, Costcutter was part of Nisa-Today’s retail buying group whose distribution 
was handled by Bibby. The retail business added £600 million to annual group turnover 
although the goodwill write-off associated with the acquisition of Costcutter reduced  recorded 
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profits of the retail operation.33 In 2009 Nisa-Today’s announced that it would terminate its 
contract with Bibby Distribution (worth £40 million per year) from 2011, after putting it out to 
tender.  Bibby Line Group’s offer to buy Nisa-Today’s for around £120 million was rejected 
because in the view of the Nisa board it undervalued the company.34    
Bibby Line Ltd (the marine subsidiary) underwent a strategic review in 2007 and the 
three main business streams (ship-owning, offshore and developing businesses) were 
demerged. The previous year Bibby acquired Colney Woodland Burials and a majority stake 
in MHL Support, a health and safety advisory company. Two years later they were both brought 
under control of the newly formed Bibby Holdings Ltd who paid £20 million for Garic, a 
specialist plant and equipment hire company.  By 2010 Bibby Holdings comprised five 
subsidiaries:  Garic, specialising in plant hire to the construction industry; Bibby Ship 
Management Group, managing third-party and Bibby vessels; Bibby Maritime Ltd, providing 
floating accommodation; MHL Support; and Woodland Burial Parks (Appendix 2).  
Discussion: entrepreneurship and strategic renewal in a family business 
John Bibby established his Liverpool-based business in 1807 and it is currently 
managed by a sixth generation member of the family, Sir Michael Bibby. Other ambitious 
entrepreneurs were attracted by opportunities in Liverpool shipping during the early nineteenth 
century  (Marriner and Hyde, 1967).  Many businesses were still operating in the twentieth 
century but only one survived into the twenty-first century (Chandler, 1960; Collard, 2002; 
Davies, 2000; Hyde, 1967). It is the premise of this article that the Bibby Line possessed 
distinctive assets, which enabled the company to survive two world wars and several economic 
crises to grow into a successful, diversified family-owned business in the twenty-first century 
(Appendix 4). There are a number of features that distinguish the Bibby Line from other 
shipping companies founded as Liverpool was becoming established as a major port and 
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eventually the ‘gateway of Empire’ (Lane, 1987). First, and most importantly, family 
ownership was consolidated in 1986 when Derek Bibby acquired the 45% of shares that had 
been owned by cousins who were descendants of James Bibby (Appendix 2). Second, there 
was a considerable amount of cross-ownership between other family shipping firms including 
the Swires, the Harrisons, the Holts and the Elder Dempsey Line (Chandler, 1960; Davies, 
2000; Hyde, 1967; Marriner and Hyde, 1967). The Bibby Line was also distinguished by a 
strong determination not to incur debt, which would have made the business vulnerable to the 
influence of non-family. At the same time, succeeding generations of the Bibby family have 
been willing to employ the skills of professional managers (Church, 1993; Hall and Nordqvist, 
2008; Stewart and Hitt, 2012). In particular, Simon Sherrard, who spanned the fifth and sixth 
generations played a crucial role in mobilising the long-standing assets possessed by the Bibby 
Line (Appendix 3).  
According to Zahra, Sapienza, and Davidsson (2006, p. 918) DCs are the ability ‘to 
reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate 
by its principle decision makers’. The Bibby family mobilised resources accrued over a 200 
year period to extend their business activities into finance, distribution and retail. These 
resources included a conservative financial strategy so that the company was not exposed to 
the threat of takeover. It was the mid-1960s before Derek Bibby first borrowed to finance the 
purchase of two bulk carriers. A strong sense of responsibility and ‘familiness’ (Cabrera-
Suarez, De Saa-Perez, and Garcia-Almeida, 2001) meant that profits were reinvested in the 
business rather than used for conspicuous consumption. In addition, this familiness helped 
create loyalty and a strong sense of common purpose amongst succeeding generations of Bibby 
employees (Habbershon and Williams, 1999). As Michael Bibby recently stated, ‘We are 
playing a long game. We have a 200-year history and aim to be around for another 200 years.’35 
Bibby are also distinguished from many other family firms by their willingness to bring non-
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family into the business. The earliest example was John Bibby’s partnership with John 
Highfield to establish a merchanting business. Other ‘outsiders’ played significant roles in the 
development of Bibby over succeeding generations. James Leyland (2nd generation), G.W. 
Robins (3rd generation), Leslie Harding (4th generation), Gerald Harding (5th generation) and 
Simon Sherrard, who spanned the 5th and 6th generations, all brought external expertise into the 
company (Mazzola, Marchisio, and Astrachan, 2008; Miller, Steier, and Le Breton-Miller, 
2003). Sherrard, in particular, was central to the reconfiguration of Bibby resources in the 
1980s and 1990s (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Zahra et al., 2008).   
The spirit of entrepreneurship was passed on to succeeding generations and can be seen 
in the actions of all owners from John Bibby’s creation of the business in 1807 to Michael 
Bibby’s continued diversification of the company since 2000 (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002; 
Rose, 1993). Entrepreneurship is inextricably linked to risk-taking and Derek Bibby’s early 
attempts at diversification led to a number of failures including a ferry business, a tank 
container business and a business providing oil-field engineering services (Kellermanns and 
Eddelston, 2006). Danneels (2011, p. 27) points out that any firm trying to mobilise dynamic 
capabilities to achieve renewal ‘needs to start with an honest assessment of its resource base’. 
As described above, we suggest that there was indeed a clear understanding of those resources, 
which enabled the company to survive from 1807. Derek Bibby’s first steps in diversification 
were based on the company’s existing resources and capabilities. If a family business is to 
maintain long-term competitivity then existing resources need to be ‘fungible’ (Chirico and 
Nordqvist, 2010; Teece, 1982). According to Danneels (2002), the ability to build new 
capabilities is regarded as a ‘second order competence’.  Michael Bibby attributes the 
company’s longevity to three factors: 
1. competency to identify and empower the right managers (shaping/reshaping 
dominant logic); 
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2. effectively manage risk [sell in boom and buy in bust] (simple routines enabling the 
seizing of opportunities); and 
3. an ability to assess the economic cycle (sensing opportunities). 
 
Bibby appear to have been particularly successful in reconfiguring external resources 
so that they were complementary to internal resources (Table 3).  Many recent acquisitions 
such as the move into retailing, woodland burials, health and safety and plant hire may appear 
to lack a coherent strategic approach to diversification. In fact, they build on long-established 
capabilities within Bibby such as a ‘conservative’ financial approach, which focuses on 
businesses that are reliable cash generators and which benefit from a management style that 
emphasises attention to detail and a long-term perspective. The idea of ‘patient capital’ is a 
well-established attribute of family firms that are not exposed to stock market short-termism 
(Colli and Rose, 2008; Dreux, 1990): 
The dividend is marginal compared to the level of profitability and cash 
generation. The majority of shareholders have basically said they don’t want the 
cash back but to build the business for the next generation. As long as we keep 
delivering our returns – which over the last 10 years, well the last 7 years have 
been about 15-16% growth so as long as we keep delivering those the shareholders 
don’t want the money back so we have to invest, we have to keep investing. If we 
sell something we have to re-invest that, so acquisitions have got to be a key part 
of that because otherwise we just build up cash.36 
 
Unlike Smith Corona (Danneels, 2011), the Bibby Line has successfully undergone 
radical change to become a ‘different kind of company’ (see Appendices 3 and 4). In the mid-
1960s it was still reliant on shipping and faced a number of significant threats to its survival. It 
is now a highly diversified company, which retains a strong sense of its history as a Liverpool-
based shipping company. This continuity enabled Derek Bibby, Simon Sherrard and Michael 
Bibby to reconfigure the company’s resources to develop substantial business activities in 
distribution, financial services and retail as well as integrating a number of smaller businesses 
into the Bibby ‘family’. Appendix 3 provides quotations from our five interviewees, which 
demonstrate the nature of dynamic capabilities that have developed over the long history of the 
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business. The essence of the Bibby approach is the ability to identify and exploit new 
opportunities, adopting a long-term perspective, real empowerment of the managerial team, 
flexible processes and structures, and a clear strategic vision (Appendix 3). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Conclusions 
While results from single case studies cannot be generalised there are several major 
theoretical implications from this analysis of the Bibby Line (Rueschemeyer, 2003). First, the 
study highlights the importance of ‘entrepreneurial cognition’ (Casson, 1993) in the context of 
a failing company. Derek Bibby demonstrated his ability to make judgements about the 
coordination of scarce resources to extend the firm’s marine-related activities and, eventually, 
create new businesses including financial services and distribution. Second, strategic flexibility 
based on entrepreneurial cognition and effective decision-making routines enabled Bibby to 
respond quickly as new opportunities arose. Third, this strategic flexibility was underpinned 
by a conservative financial approach that has characterised the company for generations. 
Finance was readily available for new acquisitions without recourse to bank loans in the 
majority of cases. Fourth, unlike most family firms, resource acquisition also included 
professional managers with new expertise (Church, 1993; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Stewart 
and Hitt, 2012). Hence, building the distribution business by acquisition and merger was itself 
part of a strategy to acquire high-calibre managers (Iain Speak, Appendix 3). Finally, retaining 
ownership within a small family group enabled Bibby to pursue a long-term orientation, which 
is simply not possible for public companies (Colli and Rose, 2008). As Sir Michael explained: 
Our history has taught us that if you stand still you’re dead and we’ve seen it. If 
you look at all the shipping companies that are no longer in Liverpool compared 
to the early 1900s it is because they never adjusted. Our market disappeared in 
1960s with the end of troop-ships. The Oxfordshire was our biggest ship and she 
was only built in 1955 and that business had gone by 1965. Yet if we’d stayed still 
we wouldn’t have survived and most British shipping companies didn’t survive 
the collapse of the Empire when all their trade disappeared.37 
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This study makes a major contribution to business history literature by demonstrating 
links between multi-generational ownership and DCs (Casson, 1993; Eisenhardt, Furr, and 
Bingham, 2010; Pandza and Thorpe, 2009). Chirico and Nordqvist (2010: p. 501) confirm that 
‘the personal characteristics of family owners’ are a dynamic component of capabilities. The 
Bibby succession process has ensured that the firm benefits from a strong ‘entrepreneurial 
legacy’, which helped develop a unique bundle of idiosyncratic resources (Handler, 1994; 
Rose, 1993; Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, and Garcia-Almeida, 2001). Second, most existing 
research on DCs is concerned with public companies in high-velocity environments (Danneels, 
2011; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Bibby is a family-owned firm operating in a moderately 
dynamic environment and our findings contrast with the view that such firms rely on detailed, 
analytic routines characterised as ‘learning-before-doing’ (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The 
way in which Bibby operated was similar to public companies in high-velocity markets because 
there was much greater emphasis on experiential routines that relied on newly created 
knowledge and iterative execution. This, as we have suggested above, typifies the importance 
of entrepreneurial cognition and the ability to respond quickly to environmental change, which 
has typified Bibby for 50 years. 
We acknowledge there are limitations associated with this analysis of the Bibby Line. 
First, rather than adopting a conventional business history approach, the concept of DCs has 
informed the interviews with members of the business and the authors’ interpretation of the 
data (Godelier, 2009). Second, although the company has existed since 1807 the focus of this 
paper has been on Bibby’s diversification over the last 50 years. In doing so, we have drawn 
heavily on interviews with Michael Bibby and Simon Sherrard as well as three other actors 
closely involved with the company. The supporting data are based on a number of sources: 
financial reports from Bibby archive, articles from the regional and national press, books on 
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the history of the Bibby Line and archival data from Liverpool Maritime Museum. However, 
we did not have access to the minutes of board meetings, which could have clarified the 
decision-making process. Instead, we have built our case for how Bibby responded to various 
financial crises by examining data from the financial press supported by interviews with Simon 
Sherrard and Michael Bibby. There is no intention to suggest that Bibby’s success can be 
explained by the family’s well-planned strategy. Derek Bibby’s use of factoring to identify 
takeover targets was a dismal failure. Serendipitously, factoring itself began to thrive and 
provided a basis for the creation of Bibby Financial Services, which contributed 10% to £1 
billion turnover in 2010. Bibby’s response to this failure illustrates the core of our argument 
about how and why the company survived when no other family-owned shipping firms in 
Liverpool still exist. The Bibby family were entrepreneurial and adaptable enough to recognise 
that the course of action they were pursuing was not working and allocated resources to 
factoring (Simon Sherrard, Appendix 3).  
In summary, the processes associated with leveraging, creating, accessing and releasing 
resources must be considered in the context of attributes associated with family firms. Such 
attributes include familiness (Habbershon and Williams, 1999), a distinctive culture (Denison, 
Lief, and Ward 2004), a long-term strategic orientation (Colli and Rose, 2008) and the inter-
generational transfer of family values (Handler, 1994). This paper also contributes to literature 
which contradicts Chandler’s (1980) assertion that family businesses lack the financial and 
human capital necessary to pursue long-term growth.  
[7930 words] 
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Appendix 1. Bibby family tree 
 
John 
Bibby 
1775–1840 
Mary 
Mellard 
1782–1819 
John 
Bibby 
1810–
1883 
Mary Penny  
nee Bibby 
1809–1887 
James 
Jenkinson 
Bibby 
1813–1897 
Joseph 
Mellard 
Bibby 
1806–1855 
Frank Bibby, 
CBE 
1857–1923 
Frank Brian 
Frederick 
Bibby 
1893–1929 
Herbert 
Kirkland 
Bibby 
1844–1927 
Cynthia Joan 
Thompson 
1921–1971 
David Robin 
Bibby 
Thompson 
1946– 
Sarah Jane  
Paton-
Smith 
1950– 
Sir Derek 
James 
Bibby, Bt, 
MC 
1922–2002 
John 
Christopher 
Bibby 
1932–1968 
Anne 
Marjorie 
Beattie 
1928– 
Joan 
Elizabeth 
Haines 
1926– 
David 
Richard 
Bibby 
1970– 
Peter John 
Bibby 
1969– 
Geoffrey  
Harold 
Bibby 
1965– 
Sir Michael 
James Bibby, 
Bt 
1963– 
Jennifer 
Margaret 
Smith 
1962– 
The Rev. 
Thomas 
Bibby 
1812–1883 
Patricia 
Mary 
Macdonald 
1921–2006 
Arthur Wilson 
Bibby 
1846–1935 
Sir Arthur Harold 
Bibby, 
Bt, DSO, DL, LLD 
1889–1986 
m 
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Appendix 2. Bibby Group (2011) 
Bibby Distribution – is one of the top 10 logistics companies in the UK with 2.5 million square 
feet of warehouse space in 80 locations, an extensive fleet of vehicles and 2,850 employees.  
 
Bibby Financial Services – has offices around the world including France, Germany, USA, 
Canada, Australia and India. As the UK’s largest independent finance provider, BFS offers a 
wide range of services to small and medium-sized enterprises: factoring, invoice discounting, 
export factoring, trade finance, new start finance, construction finance and leasing finance.  
 
Bibby Line – currently has two major ships: MV Shropshire (57,000 dwt) and MV 
Hertfordshire (2,475 dwt) with another bulk carrier currently being built in China (57,000 dwt). 
 
Bibby Maritime – supplies coastels, which are floating accommodation vessels that can be 
chartered for short- or long-term use. Bibby has a fleet of coastels that provide flotel 
accommodation for a wide range of clients.    
 
Bibby Retail Services – Costcutter has more than 1,500 convenience stores throughout the UK 
with offices in York and Belfast. The annual turnover for 2009/2010 was £606m. The Chief 
Executive Colin Graves is a ‘local’ man, fitting with the company’s slogan ‘Proud to be local.’ 
He has good experience from his time as Chief Executive of Yorkshire County Cricket Club.  
 
Bibby Holdings – manages the businesses listed below, which are intentionally diverse but 
culturally similar to the Bibby Line Group. Cy Green is the CEO, a prominent figure who is 
also chairman/investor in Encraft Ltd: 
 
Bibby Offshore – Chairman Howard Woodcock has been involved with Bibby Line for 11 
years, showing long-term commitment. Has headquarters in Aberdeen but with an international 
presence.  
 
Bibby Ship Management – provides a diverse range of services including technical 
management through to payroll and employment services. Has six offices in three continents. 
 
Bibby Consulting and Support – provides support for businesses, helping them to comply to 
employment law, health and safety remits and environmental consideration. Managing director 
is Michael Slade, who has a vast amount of experience in consultancy and the banking industry.  
 
Garic – provides a wide range of products including storage tanks (antifreeze), site solutions 
including cabins, waste tanks and generators, drip trays/drum storage, mobile welfare including 
liquid soap, toilet roles and drinking water. Turnover has doubled to £12 million and employee 
numbers have risen to 95 in the last four years.  
 
Woodland Burial Parks – has an annual turnover of £1.8m, now employs 50 people across the 
country. Bibby Line Group bought a controlling interest in this company in 2006.  
  
 
 
Appendix 3. Summary of interview data 
  Michael Bibby Simon Sherrard David Robertson Iain Speak Nick Bacon 
Leveraging By the mid-1980s we started 
further diversifying into more 
niche activities within shipping 
like floating accommodation and  
jack-ups. We went into leasing 
first so we were using our 
shipping knowledge to actually 
set-up some leasing operations. 
But there was a step which was 
actually a leasing portfolio 
concentrating on the moving 
business and leasing and 
factoring are completely separate 
things. We did diversify into 
related areas and also within 
other business portfolios. So we 
weren’t so exposed to 
commodity products where the 
cyclical effect was far bigger 
than our balance sheet could 
take.  
The reason for diversification 
was because the shipping 
industry was very volatile and 
the banks were getting 
increasingly edgy about the 
volatility. We weren’t doing 
very well as a business and so 
when we diversified it initially 
was primarily a financial 
decision.  We diversified into 
accommodation barges and 
North Sea oil platforms but we 
found that they also went like 
that (were volatile) but not 
necessarily in the same cycle. 
In one or two European 
countries we actually started 
by setting up just a small 
sales office and building it 
that way. Even there it 
would have been local 
managers and finding the 
right people within the 
marketplace who could 
understand our culture. Our 
culture drives our business. 
Without it we wouldn’t have 
the success we’ve had to 
date. So they need to have 
compatibility and need to 
understand what we’re about 
as a business. 
What else could we do  
within the broad context of 
logistics and supply chain? 
We actually went out and 
acquired a labour agency 
business. At the time 
internally we were spending 
about £10 million on agency 
workers. So we bought a 
labour agency business with 
a view of scaling it up using 
the inherent demand within 
Bibby Distribution as a base 
to open up new offices 
which could hit the ground 
running.   
The migration from ships to 
containers, accommodation 
platforms – it’s all broadly 
the same sector. I know 
nothing about shipping but 
you can see connections 
there. As soon as you’ve got 
containers, you’re into 
transport and Bibby’s 
containers were for 
chemicals and pressurised 
gases. As soon as you’re 
shipping containers you’re 
into transporting containers 
and so the connection into 
warehousing and logistics 
and distribution – you know 
– is indicative of a strategy. 
Creating It is evident they had strategic 
intent to diversify but very little 
money. I mean how do you build 
up a larger business without any 
cash. That is why they went into 
financial services initially to look 
at small businesses and invest 
debt as well as equity in the ones 
they thought they could grow and 
every single business went bust. 
But the factoring business grew 
into our biggest business. The 
other one in distribution they 
went into taking over loss 
making with small distribution 
companies and built a national 
network so there was a plan. 
The debt factoring business was 
already in existence when I 
arrived and it was being done 
on a Friday afternoon by the 
chief accountant John Connell. 
The first decision which we 
took in 1985, I said to the 
board, I said effectively – and 
excuse my French, ‘You’ve got 
to shit or get off the pot’. So we 
made John the managing 
director of factoring, gave him 
some money, set it up as a 
separate company and said get 
on with it! 
John Connell, the group 
financial controller, took 
over that responsibility and 
he had no knowledge of 
factoring so it was very 
much learning from first 
principals. You need an 
electronic platform that can 
be accessed by clients. It 
needs staff who understand 
credit control.  The third 
skill is technically having 
the funding and that’s a big 
issue for a private company 
like ourselves. At the 
moment we’ve probably got 
worldwide about £800m of 
In a sense we are replicating 
what Group has done over 
the past 20 years. Building 
our own portfolio of 
businesses within the broad 
definition of logistics. You 
could step back from Bibby 
Distribution and say, what is 
it we do, yes we run trucks, 
we run sheds, but what are 
our real core competencies? 
It is about efficiently 
managing lots of people – 
that is actually what we do. 
The fact that they drive 
trucks and work in 
warehouses doesn’t really 
I think that the back office 
functionality of credit 
control was a core 
competency in the factoring 
business that they acquired 
rather than in Bibby itself. 
Let’s put it this way – you’re 
never going to make money 
out of factoring if you cannot 
manage the debt because the 
day you buy the invoice, 
you’ve got to be chasing it. I 
knew that from my own 
business experience and so 
strong financial control of 
debtors is core to my 
business and it’s absolutely 
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funding and if we double in 
the next three years to five 
years which we expect, we’d 
move up to say £2 billion 
and have to find avenues to 
source that funding. 
matter.  So, you could apply 
those principles to other 
industries and other sectors. 
 
the core competency of a 
factoring business.   
Accessing He (Derek) realised that as a 
family business he had to get 
some decent managers and then 
delegate more responsibility. He 
realised that if he wanted to 
grow and develop the business 
he needed to give more 
responsibility to managers 
otherwise they wouldn’t stay 
with us, so the culture started 
changing. New people were 
brought into senior positions and 
the culture changed to what it is 
today by investing in people. 
Anyone can have the best 
business idea and the best plan 
to do it but if they are not the 
right people then they will never 
implement it and drive it 
forward. 
When Derek retired I came in 
as MD. The board in 1985 was 
Derek, Robin Thompson 
(cousin), myself and Bob Scott 
(company secretary). We then 
moved to a normal type of 
board and that’s when John 
Wood joined us as our first 
independent director. Richard 
Baker came in as non-
executive chairman. I recruited 
Malcolm Gorley who had an 
oil industry background which 
was of interest to us. So over 
the latter part of the 1980s the 
board took a more 
contemporary look. Effectively 
it’s what you see today where 
we have three executive 
directors. 
The key to our future abroad 
was finding the right 
management team to run the 
business. Now, if you take 
America we kicked off in 
2001 in the US, we had to 
ask two chief executives, 
from the UK, to step down. 
Now we have an American 
chief executive and at long 
last we have got the business 
right and it’s building and 
we’re making profits, but we 
had seven/eight years of 
quite steep learning as to the 
American culture which is 
totally foreign to the UK 
culture. 
Our current acquisition is 
definitely more strategic. We 
want a freight-forwarding 
business because we can see 
opportunities for developing 
joint propositions with 
Bibby Financial Services. 
We can sell trade finance 
and freight forwarding as a 
combined offering. We see 
freight forwarding as a route 
into overseas territories. If 
we entered the Indian market 
with our core logistic 
services it would be highly 
risky. Whereas with freight 
forwarding you don’t 
employ a lot of people and 
therefore is a low risk way 
of entering a market and 
then we could grow it from 
there. 
I observed it with the likes of 
David Robertson and Simon 
Sherrard and a preparedness 
to bring in outside people. I 
was deeply respectful of a 
business that is able to plan 
for the long term.  So it 
requires you to think – it’s a 
horrible burden it strikes me. 
The ability of Simon 
Sherrard and David 
Robertson to win the trust of 
the family and to make shed-
loads of money for them 
without an equity stake is 
enviable. 
 
Releasing The Staffordshire was an 
absolute bloody disaster and 
went straight into lay-off for two 
years. It was the biggest ship we 
had in the fleet and should never 
have been ordered. He (Derek) 
had just gone on-site and ordered 
it because he was offered what 
he thought was a decent price. 
Now that wouldn’t have 
happened later on because you’d 
have had to put a paper in to the 
Group board and nobody in their 
right mind would have signed 
I had a trading background and 
knew a bit about that sort of 
world and the opportunity came 
up to buy into Freeway 
Distributors, it wasn’t 
struggling at the time but it very 
soon struggled financially 
thereafter. We bought 25% and 
then the balance for practically 
nothing. That was the birth of 
our distribution business but we 
also did some other thing. One 
of our factoring clients was in 
the oil service business doing 
engineering drawings. That 
The driving forces are fairly 
old school. It’s to drive up 
revenue and profitability of 
the Group. One of the 
avenues to solve the problem 
of funding BFS may be to 
float it on the stock market 
or take it out of the portfolio 
and sell it. That’s not in the 
picture at the moment, but 
that could be. Michael has 
talked to the Bibby Line 
Group – you build a business  
and then sell it or float it on 
the market.  We haven’t 
It (distribution) worked quite 
well for the first couple of 
years and we opened up 
offices in Leeds, 
Manchester, Stoke and two 
in Scunthorpe. Just about to 
open up in Bicester when 
recession comes along. The 
business took a dip and so 
we closed offices. We stuck 
with it  and now we have 
started opening up offices 
again and so it did not go 
quite as planned, but what 
we realised was because of 
There are some people who 
fell out of the process and 
left the company which is 
always a shame in my view 
but at the end of the day, you 
know, this is not a 
democracy. You own the 
business, you must make 
decisions and live with the 
consequences and other 
people don’t like it they 
should leave if they can’t be 
persuaded. 
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anything on-site without the 
authority for doing it. 
failed as an investment and we 
got out of that. We opened a 
ferry business which also 
failed, so not everything we 
touched turned to gold. 
done it yet and I don’t see it 
happening in the next year to 
two but that could be a way. 
Michael is driven by 
achieving year on year 
growth in the bottom line for 
the Bibby Line Group and 
that’s one way of achieving 
it.   
the infrastructure and the 
capabilities of the core, we 
could actually open up 
offices very quickly and we 
can actually close offices 
very quickly.   
 
 
Dynamic 
capabilities 
I actually think that’s the skill of 
management. Going with the 
flow and adjusting your plans to 
your circumstances. It’s about 
adapting and exploiting 
opportunities as they appear. 
You have an overall strategic 
vision of where you are trying to 
get to and then you are 
continually tweaking all the little 
knobs to adjust it to actually 
work out how to capitalise on 
the best opportunities that 
present themselves. 
We’ve obviously developed 
our processes and our 
structures but I suppose the 
defining aspect is that we have 
a very small head office. We’re 
not telling our subsidiaries 
what to do – we’re using the 
skills of our subsidiaries to 
help other group companies. 
For example the IT department 
of our distribution business 
actually provides IT services to 
a number of companies in the 
Group. We’re not replicating 
Group IT, HR or procurement. 
Basically Group is there to 
effectively oversee the 
investment. 
The one thing I did when I 
came in was enabling my 
managing directors. I had 
four units, I gave them 
autonomy, I empowered 
them and they ran their own 
business and it was a light 
touch from me and that 
empowerment really was the 
energy that created the 
development within BFS. I 
would say Michael is doing 
the same across all the 
divisions. He has his say on 
the strategy, as does the 
Bibby Line Group board. 
But if you look at the 
divisional strategies they are 
laid down by the executive 
teams in those businesses. 
I also think that strategy 
emerges, and we refer to our 
strategy as something that is 
emergent. So we have 
objectives in the direction of 
travel and then the things 
ebb and flow and weave 
towards those objectives as 
they emerge. I think the 
danger of having a strategy 
that it is fixed is – by the 
time you have written it 
something has changed 
either within your 
organisation, outside your 
organisation, the economy or 
whatever. 
 
 
 
I admire hugely the ability to 
see an opportunity and grasp 
it and that (move into 
factoring) turned into a 
fantastic business which is 
the hallmark of 
entrepreneurship. Well, 
you’ve got to make decisions 
and you’ve got to do stuff 
and it comes from that 
breeding. That legacy of 
thinking for the long term 
and, you know, without 
being too philosophical here, 
we  whinge about short 
termism and it is the death of 
enterprise because things 
have work immediately. 
Familiness We know from our shipping 
history that markets don’t have to 
be good all the time. We 
understand cycles and we 
actually like investing in markets 
at the bottom on the basis there 
will be an upside. So we’re not 
worried about going into the 
SME market many people 
wouldn’t touch because actually 
it looks a good market to us 
dealing with small businesses 
because we are aware of 
managing risk. Shipping has 
Take this building and look at 
its unbelievably traditional 
exterior and walk inside and 
you see a twenty-first century 
office building. Now that sums 
up Bibby. When we moved 
here I gutted the whole of this, 
there’s only one door in the 
same place as when we took 
over the building. But that to 
some extent sums up Bibby; 
it’s a twenty-first century 
business but hasn’t lost what is 
important about the tradition. 
Michael has developed 
Bibby social responsibility.  
We encourage all our teams 
to raise money for charity 
and we’re into carbon 
savings. Michael is funding 
forests in India to counter 
the effects of carbon we 
generate in our shipping and 
transportation areas. We 
have brand values at Bibby 
Line Group. We’re very 
much more aware of people 
being the key to our success 
The long-term view comes 
about as a result of two 
things really. One is they 
have been in business for 
204 years and their 
motivation is really about 
the long term and future 
generations. The second 
aspect is that for probably 
180 something years it has 
been a shipping line and as a 
shipping line, they have 
made money out of buying 
and selling assets and 
Now if you’re prepared to 
plan for seven years to build 
a ship or a hundred and forty 
years because that’s your 
heritage, you can afford to 
really go for something and 
take the setbacks. The Bibby 
Group, you know, have had 
really serious life-
threatening setbacks 
including the loss of the MV 
Derbyshire with all hands. 
What do you do?  Do you 
give up? Or do you pick 
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taught us that the whole business 
is about managing risk. So to go 
into distribution and be losing £4 
million a year, most businesses 
and most management teams 
would have ditched it. We were, 
okay, is it possible to turn this 
business around, if so what do 
we have to do, how the hell do 
we do it, who do we need to 
bring in to do it? We only ditch 
businesses when we actually 
realise we’ve made a total cock-
up and there isn’t any hope of 
ever delivering on our objectives. 
 rather than just the balance 
sheet. So it’s very much 
more people orientated and 
that transformation really 
has been down to Michael. 
He has gone through and 
come out the other side, so 
he’s has done a fantastic job. 
I’m sure it was a tough 
journey for him, but he’s 
definitely come through that 
journey now. So that’s the 
Bibby Line Group. 
historically, the buying and 
selling assets has been over a 
long-term horizon – 15–25 
years from the bottom of the 
market to the top of the 
market with a long-term 
view. It is that long-term 
view of doing business... is 
just the way they think 
which is complete opposite 
to a PLC or a VC backed 
business. 
 
yourselves up and get on 
with it because you’re 
building for the long term, 
and that’s their huge asset. 
It’s psychological – you 
know, we’re in this for the 
long term. What was the 
downside risk in taking on a 
factoring business? What’s 
the worst that’s going to 
happen? You’re not going to 
get paid – so what do you 
do? You make getting paid 
your core competency and 
Bibby’s ethos is cash is king. 
 
Michael Bibby – Current MD of Bibby Line Group      
David Robertson – MD of Bibby Financial Services 1990 to 2011 
Simon Sherrard – MD of Bibby Lines Group 1985 to 2000 (current non-executive director) 
Iain Speak – Current MD of Bibby Distribution 
Nick Bacon – Head of company responsible for marketing Bibby Factors
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Table 1 Liverpool shipping families  
 
Business Start date Milestones Result Key reference 
Elder Dempsey 1868 Company founded 
1879, Alfred Jones 
joins  
 
1884 Jones gains 
control of E-D 
1909 Jones dies 
Begins trade to West 
Africa 
Took over the British 
& African SS Co 
Dominant in West 
African trade 
 
Taken over by Royal 
Mail Group 
Davies (2000) 
Harrisons 1820 1884 formed 
Charente 
Steamship Co 
 
2000 shipping 
company sold to 
P&O 
Company grew rapidly 
 
 
Within two years 
company closed 
Hyde (1967) 
Holts 1852 1865 formed 
Ocean Steamship 
Co  
1945 takeover of 
Liner Holdings 
1985 moved out of 
deep-sea trading 
 
Rapid expansion 
 
Consolidation 
 
 
Wound-up in 2000 
Hyde (1956) 
Swires 1816 1860s trade with 
China and Japan 
1870s acted as 
agents for Holts 
 
1898 John Swire 
dies 
Open up trade with 
China 
 
Close working 
relationship with Holts 
 
Taken over by Blue 
Funnel Line in 1911 
Marriner and Hyde 
(1967) 
 
 
  
39 
 
Table 2 Six generations of the Bibby Line 
Generation MD Management 
tenure 
Key events 
First  John Bibby 1807 to 1840 Creation of the Bibby Line in 1807 
Built fleet of 18 vessels 
Established Mediterranean trade 
Some trade with Bombay and Canton 
Second James (son) 1840 to 1897 Fleet of 23 steam ships by 1865 
Association with Harland and Wolff 
James ‘retires’ in 1973 
James establishes limited liability company 
in 1890 
Separation of owners and managers  
Third Arthur 
(nephew of 
James) 
1897 to 1935 Consolidates links with Burma 
Seven ships less than 10 years old in 1914 
Fleet requisitioned for First World War 
Post-war turbulence 
Focus on Burma trade 
Fourth Harold 
(Arthur’s son) 
1935 to 1965 Fleet requisitioned for Second World War 
Decline of Far East trade 
Containerisation and air travel 
Fifth Derek 
(Harold’s son) 
1965 to 1985 Two bulk carriers from Japan in 1965 
Borrowed finance 
Oil shocks of 1970s 
Marine diversification 
Regained financial control 
Appointed Simon Sherrard MD 
Diversification into financial services and 
logistics 
Sixth Michael 
(Derek’s son) 
2000 to present Continued diversification 
Rapid growth of the business 
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Table 3 Dynamic capabilities in the Bibby Line 
Year Strategic 
initiative 
Change 
mechanism 
Capability changed Driver of change 
1980 Leveraging Derek Bibby’s 
entrepreneurship 
Extended shipping 
knowledge  
Decline of shipping 
activities 
1982 Creating Extension of existing 
managerial capabilities 
Moving from financial 
control to credit control 
Need to broaden 
customer base and give 
protection from cyclical 
nature of shipping 
1985 Accessing Acquisition of new 
managerial capabilities 
Logistics Low levels of liquidity 
(cash) 
1978  
 
 
 
2004 
Releasing 
 
 
 
Releasing 
Move into shipping-
related activities 
 
 
Shift from reliance on 
shipping to more 
diversified activities 
No change of capability 
 
 
 
No change of capability 
 
 
 
Decline in demand for 
shipping 
 
 
Strategic response to 
‘boom’ in shipping 
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